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Howard and Iris Kaplan Memorial Lecture Series Address
Hon. William J. Nardini
Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY, March 31, 2022
Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you Dean Prudenti for that very kind
introduction. It’s an honor to be here today speaking at the Maurice Deane Law
School at Hofstra.
I’m especially pleased that we can see each other in person. It was about two
years ago when COVID first flooded over us, only a few months after I became a
judge. The pandemic pushed our Court, like much of the world, into a universe of
video conferences and remote arguments. If you’re like me, you’re probably
relieved to be back in the classroom, or the courtroom, after too many hours on Zoom
sessions. But even clouds have silver linings, and we all learned something from
working remotely. For example, I learned that when I’m trapped in my house during
a snowstorm, I can still hear oral arguments from my dining room over Zoom, and—
even better—nobody can tell from the video link that my judicial robe is still hanging
in chambers at the courthouse, and what I’m actually wearing is one of my kids’
Harry Potter robes. (The key is to hide the Gryffindor logo.) Today, I’m especially
grateful to see all your smiling faces live (and not an array of your video feeds).
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On a personal note, let me say what a delight it is to give this lecture in
memory of Howard and Iris Kaplan. I’ve had the privilege of knowing their son
Tony and his wife Marilyn for over twenty years. Tony is one of Hofstra Law
School’s most distinguished alumni—a brilliant lawyer who clerked for Chief Judge
Wilfred Feinberg, one of the greatest judges to serve on the Second Circuit. Tony
has dedicated his career to serving the public as a prosecutor—first for New York
State, then for the U.S. Department of Justice. Most of his career has been spent at
the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Connecticut, where I had the great fortune of having
Tony first as a mentor, and later as a valued colleague and dear friend. So, thanks
very much to the Kaplan family for their role in making this happen.
You will note, of course, that I met AUSA Kaplan in New Haven,
Connecticut—far to the north of Hofstra, across the Long Island Sound. Why, you
might justifiably ask, should your law school invite a speaker from the faraway
Constitution State, land of nutmeg and steady habits? Well, I hope that my presence
here can remind us of the ties that bind us together, in Connecticut and Long Island.
In part, the ties are geographical. We are all proud inhabitants of the best
federal judicial circuit in the land—Second perhaps in name, but not in the hearts of
our legal practitioners. In fact, for my first two years as a judge, my office window
looked directly south across New Haven Harbor and the Sound, where in the
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distance, the only man-made structure visible to the naked eye was that great
landmark of modern architecture: the Central Islip Courthouse.
Geography isn’t everything, of course. The ties between Connecticut and
Long Island are historical as well. Indeed, they are older than the federal judiciary
itself. And so, before I turn to my principal topic today—which is the place of
foreign law in American courts—I hope you will forgive me for a brief historical
detour about how (but for a cruel twist of fate) those of us in Connecticut and Long
Island would have even more in common than we do today.
This story—like most good stories—starts with a king getting his head
chopped off. During the English Civil War in 1649, fifty-nine judges assembled to
sign a death warrant for King Charles I. Oliver Cromwell eventually assumed the
title of Lord Protector of the realm. Upon his death eleven years later (in 1660), the
son of the beheaded king was restored to the throne. That son was Charles II.
Understandably, Charles II didn’t feel much love for the judges who had sentenced
his father to death. He sent emissaries to track them down in England and overseas.
Three of those fifty-nine judges concern us today: John Dixwell, Edward Whalley,
and William Goffe. Those three fled to the Puritan colonies in North America, which
were sympathetic to their cause. Each, for a time, took refuge in New Haven to
escape royal vengeance.
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Dixwell was the luckiest of the three. The Crown thought he had died, and so
he was able to live out his days peacefully in New Haven under a pseudonym: “John
Davids.” In fact, he was buried only a short walk from my chambers. Whalley and
Goffe, however, constantly had to stay one step ahead of their pursuers. Most
famously, for a time they hid in a giant tumble of boulders which is known today as
the Judges’ Cave, atop a cliff known as West Rock Ridge. Eventually, they were
chased out of the cave not by the English, but by a panther. (I like to take my clerks
on hikes up to the Judges’ Cave. It’s a good reminder of the perils of judicial hubris.)
The three judges were never caught. And so Charles II took his revenge
against the independent colony of New Haven for having protected the regicides.
He did two things. For one, he had New Haven absorbed into the more loyal, and
royal, colony to the north, which was known as the Connecticut Colony (based in
Hartford). For another, he looked at Long Island, whose towns were settled by
people from New England, not from New York. Although some sensible folk in
what is now known as Suffolk County pressed to be part of Connecticut, they
ultimately had to yield. All of Long Island became a part of the newly organized
colony of New York—named after the King’s brother, the Duke of York—instead
of Connecticut.
So, what is the moral of this story? It is simply this: Had the regicides chosen
somewhere else besides New Haven as their hide-out, I’d be speaking to you today—
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here at Hofstra’s law school—at what would undoubtedly be known as the most
illustrious law school in Connecticut.
Connecticut’s loss, though, has been New York’s gain. I would be remiss if
I did not recognize that Hofstra Law School is celebrating an important milestone
this year: the school’s 50th anniversary. From its earliest days, Hofstra has earned
a reputation for innovative legal training. Let me sincerely congratulate the many
people who have made Hofstra Law School’s remarkable growth possible.
And to turn to the substance of what I’d like to talk about today, let me suggest
another goal to which Hofstra might aspire, to remain on the cutting edge of legal
education: that is, the importance of training our future lawyers on how foreign law
fits into American legal practice. To illustrate, I want to talk about the role that
foreign law plays in federal courts.
In 1998, Sandra Day O’Connor published a commentary entitled “Broadening
Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law.”1 In that
article, she talked about how advances in communications technology were
shrinking the modern world; about the need for a deeper understanding of foreign
cultures; and about how to survive in an increasingly multinational environment.
The legal profession, she noted, suffered from being too “insular” and “shortsighted” right from the beginning of our careers. We have a natural tendency to look
Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must
Learn About Foreign Law, 45-SEP FED. LAW. 20 (1998).
1
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to the laws of our own states; in federal law, we focus on the decisions of our local
circuit court of appeals. That makes sense, of course. These decisions are binding
upon us. But increasingly, we also have to set our eyes further, beyond the horizon.
As Justice O’Connor accurately predicted, questions of foreign law arise more and
more often in domestic legal practice. The answers to those questions are rarely to
be found in the pages of the Federal Reporter. As a result, there is a corresponding
need for the legal profession to have a working knowledge of how to solve foreign
legal issues. And when I say “legal profession,” I mean lawyers and judges,
academics and law students.
That process of learning how to analyze foreign law problems should begin
early, in law school—as it does with our training on how to analyze issues of U.S.
law—and it should continue throughout one’s legal career. There is no doubt:
sorting through foreign legal issues can be tricky. They are, in more ways than one,
“foreign” to us. They often require proficiency in a language other than English.
And even when translated into English, they involve unfamiliar legal concepts and
frames of reference. And so, dealing with them requires us to start from a very
simple premise: we have to learn how to speak with each other across legal divides,
both linguistically and conceptually.
Linguistically, we need to do better. When I worked overseas, there was a
common joke, which maybe you’ve heard before. What do you call someone who
6

speaks two languages? Bilingual. What do you call someone who speaks three
languages? Trilingual. And what do you call someone who speaks one language?
American. Language study in America is often required for a couple of years in high
school, and depending on where you go, maybe a bit in college. Too often, formal
language study stops there, leaving many students with little ability to ask much
beyond quaint phrases like, “Où est la bibliothèque?” We must encourage greater
language competency—whether by moving beyond those high school classes or
building on native proficiencies in second and third languages from one’s family
background—to acquire the specialized legal vocabulary in a given language. There
can be no doubt that lawyers of the future will have a competitive advantage if they
can speak more than one language.
Of course, I understand that we can’t all be polyglots. But that brings me to
my other point: to be successful, lawyers must achieve competency in speaking other
legal languages conceptually, if not linguistically. We must learn to be at least
conversant in the basic concepts and structures of other systems of law, beyond the
familiar common-law system. We need at least a passing familiarity with, say, the
civil law system, derived from Roman law and filtered through its more modern
French and German models. And we need to recognize that there are other legal
traditions in the world—say, in China—which are different yet again.
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We need to understand when we are looking at a country where judicial
pronouncements of a higher court, like the United States Supreme Court, are
precedents that bind the decision-making of inferior courts. And we must recognize
when, instead, we are looking at a country where the notion of binding precedent
would be anathema, viewed as tantamount to placing the judiciary over the
legislature.
In the world of criminal procedure, we need to recognize when we are looking
at a country with an inquisitorial model, compared to our adversarial model—or
perhaps a country that has adopted some sort of hybrid.
In short, we need to understand that there are other systems far removed from
our American experiences, so that we do not make erroneous assumptions about how
those systems work. A failure to comprehend these differences can be fatal to a
client’s case.
Before going any further, let me be clear about two things that I’m not talking
about today. First, I’m not talking about the idea that U.S. courts should look abroad
to the laws or judicial opinions of other countries for guidance on how to interpret
American laws. Our Constitution and laws have been adopted in a specific context,
and through a specific democratic process here in the United States. And with
certain narrow exceptions, looking to foreign sources to interpret and apply
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American law would be inconsistent with that democratic process and—just as
bad—betray an ignorance of the very different contexts in which foreign law
develops in different countries.
Second, I’m also not talking about policy questions. It makes perfect sense
for legislators to look at ways in which other countries have addressed issues that
we are facing here in the United States. Unlike the judiciary, our political branches
have a legitimately creative role in our legal system, and it is appropriate for them
to study the successes and failures of other nations’ laws.
No, what I want to talk about today is more mundane. I want to talk about
how the courts deal with foreign law in real-life cases, and accordingly how lawyers
should be equipped to litigate those foreign-law issues.
In some ways, of course, American lawyers already have a leg up. We’re used
to sorting through questions of state versus federal law. And when state law governs
a problem, we are accustomed to figuring out which state’s laws apply. In federal
court, this comes up all the time in diversity cases. We know how to research the
laws in, say, New York and New Jersey. We know how to read state statutes. And
we know how to look up state court decisions in Westlaw. The legal terminology
and the legal concepts used among the states are, generally, consistent and easily
understood by all American lawyers.
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It’s much harder when we have to look at the laws of France, or Brazil, or
Namibia. And there is an incredible range of contexts in which foreign law may be
dispositive of cases in American courts. This is mostly true in international civil
litigation. But it can also extend to some areas of criminal law.
On the civil side, we are frequently confronted by choice-of-law problems.
Whose law governs a contract dispute, where one party is in New York and the other
in Tokyo? Does the contract have a choice-of-law clause? Does it specify a venue
for dispute resolution? Which jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules apply? Let me offer
just a few examples that we’ve confronted in the Second Circuit. In one case, we
considered the tort claims of a U.S. passenger on an American Airlines flight from
New York to Puerto Vallarta, arising out of the suspected use of marijuana during
the plane’s final descent. We applied New York choice-of-law rules; and they led
to the conclusion that Mexican law governed the dispute.2
In another case, we looked at a maritime tort action brought in New York after
a container ship sank. The case could have been governed by the laws of five
different countries: South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden,

2

Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1998).
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or Panama. We ultimately found that Korean law applied and decided the claims
under that country’s laws.3
We see many cases in New York seeking enforcement of foreign money
judgments4 or foreign arbitral awards5 in the United States. We are all too often
called upon to consider a foreign country’s family laws under the Hague Convention
for the return of children, in custody disputes.6 We have even had to consider foreign
patrimony laws, in disputes over antiquities that are brought into the United States,
to decide whether those treasures need to be repatriated.7
On the criminal side, issues of foreign law are less common. But they do arise
in specific and often predictable ways. In extradition cases, where one country seeks
to have a fugitive sent back for trial, we consider whether the offense satisfies the
dual criminality requirement of our extradition treaties. (I’ll come back to this.)
Other circumstances include invoking foreign law to justify non-compliance with a
document subpoena, and defenses to prosecution generally.8 And to take a very
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Rationis Enterprises Inc. of Panama v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., 426 F.3d 580, 585–88 (2d Cir.

2005).
See, e.g., Servipronto De El Salvador, S.A. v. McDonald’s Corp., 837 F. App’x 817, 819 (2d Cir. 2020);
Beyonics Int’l PTE Ltd. v. Smith, 833 F. App’x 492, 493 (2d Cir. 2020); Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir. 1973).
5
See, e.g., Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 864 F.3d 172,
178–79 (2d Cir. 2017).
6
See, e.g., Velozny v. Velozny, No. 21-1993-CV, 2021 WL 5567265, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2021); Blondin
v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 410 (2d Cir. 2003).
8
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1, Advisory Committee Notes to 1944 Addition; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201,
2312 to 2317.
4
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unusual example, consider the Lacey Act. That U.S. law makes it a crime for any
person to knowingly import or export fish, wildlife, or plants that are taken,
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of foreign law or Indian tribal law.9
Fascinatingly, an individual can be prosecuted in the United States for a Lacey Act
offense based on a violation of a foreign country’s laws, even if the underlying
conduct does not violate any other U.S. law.10 Similarly, a scheme to defraud a
foreign government of tax revenue has been found to be a criminal offense in
violation of the U.S. federal wire fraud statute.11

This, of course, requires

consideration of foreign tax laws.
With this breadth of foreign law issues and contexts in mind, I’d like to use
the remainder of my time today to talk about three things. First, I’d like to discuss
the general framework within which federal judges can resolve foreign legal issues,
and present some of the challenges inherent in that process. Second, I’d like to bring
these general ideas to life with an example that I often confronted in my previous
life, during my four-year stint as the U.S. Department of Justice Attaché in Rome.
Specifically, let me talk about the dual criminality requirement that is embedded in
most modern extradition treaties. Third, I’d like to use an example from my time on

9

16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1)–(2).
Bettina Bammer-Whitaker, The Lacey Act and Proof of Foreign Law in Domestic Criminal Proceedings:
A Critical Look at the Seventh Circuit’s Approach in Bodum USA v. La Cafetière, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
175, 182 (2012).
11
See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354 (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
10
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the bench involving civil law. And so I’ll discuss a rather complex case involving a
U.S. antitrust claim that required analysis of Chinese law.
First, the legal framework. The Federal Rules give us guidance on how to
resolve issues of foreign law in the courts. Civil Rule 44.1 and Criminal Rule 26.1
operate largely the same way, so I’ll talk about them together. (To the extent there
are differences, they relate to constitutional protections specific to criminal
prosecutions that are not pertinent to our discussion today.)12
The rules have three important features. First, a party intending to raise an
issue about a foreign country’s law must give reasonable notice to the court and the
other parties by a pleading or other writing. Second, in determining foreign law, the
court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Third,
the determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.13
These rules were adopted in 1966 to address flaws and ambiguity in how
federal courts were to make determinations of foreign law. The notice requirement
was added to avoid unfair surprise and to clarify that the applicability of foreign law
need not be in a pleading under Rule 8(a). Instead, because the relevance of foreign
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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee notes to the 1966 Amendments; Fed. R. Cr. P. 26.1 advisory
committee notes to the 1944 Addition.
13
Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Fed. R. Cr. P. 26.1.
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law may not be clear from the outset of a case, notice is sufficient so long as it is
“reasonable.”14
The liberalization of evidentiary standards regarding the materials a court can
consider in making a foreign law determination was intended to provide greater
flexibility to the judge. Previously, Rule 43(a) often required courts to look to state
law to find the rules of evidence by which the content of foreign-country law is to
be established.

The variation in state laws made the process inefficient and

cumbersome, and prevented the examination of material that would otherwise have
been helpful in making a proper determination. The new rule also allows federal
courts to engage in their own research so they don’t have to rely only on party
submissions.15
Finally, the rules’ requirement that determinations of foreign law are
questions of law, rather than of fact, is designed to do two things. At the district
court level, the rule allows the judge, rather than the jury, to make the finding as to
the substance of a foreign law. And on appeal, as a question of law, we can review
it de novo rather than being constrained by the clearly erroneous standard that would
otherwise apply to factual determinations.16

14
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee notes to the 1966 Amendments; Fed. R. Cr. P. 26.1 advisory
committee notes to the 1944 Addition.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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As a practical matter, there is some overlap between traditional legal and
factual inquiries in the process of making a determination of foreign law. That is
primarily because of the limited tools and methods federal courts have readily
accessible to them. Courts may consider any material the parties wish to present as
proof of the purportedly applicable foreign law, including contractual choice of law
clauses, statutes, administrative material, and judicial decisions. Expert testimony
is frequently provided by parties to explain or clarify the meaning, application, or
function of a foreign law. Under the rules, courts have broad discretion to engage
in their own research on the relevant topic. We can ask the parties to give us extra
briefing. We can invite amicus briefs if the parties’ submissions are insufficient.
And in rare cases (as I’ll discuss in greater detail shortly), foreign governments can
appear in cases to explain their own law to the court.17
As various courts and observers have noted, each of these methods suffers
from shortcomings that federal courts need to be aware of in making any decision.
First, any expert testimony offered on behalf of a party is potentially at risk of
expressing a biased or skewed opinion in favor of the party that’s paying their expert
fees. Likewise, the motives of a foreign government could run counter to the district
court’s responsibility for getting the foreign law right and, depending on the form or
quality of the government making such a submission, may be driven by factors that
17

9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2444 (3d ed. 2022).
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are inconsistent with U.S. norms of adherence to the rule of law. And of course, a
court’s ability to conduct its own research may be constrained by a relative lack of
knowledge or familiarity with the particular foreign legal system, and the law clerk
may not have access to library materials sufficient to complete (or at least efficiently
complete) the task.
So, how does this all work in practice? It depends a bit on the context, as you
might imagine, and the role you’re playing in that context. That’s why I wanted to
flesh this out first with an example drawn from my time as a prosecutor and attaché
in Italy, and then finish with another from my time on the bench.
And so let’s talk about extraditions. Extraditions are usually done pursuant to
bilateral treaties, and they come in two flavors: old-fashioned “list treaties,” and the
more modern “dual criminality treaties.” A “list treaty” is precisely what it sounds
like. It contains a list of extraditable offenses: murder, rape, robbery, and so forth.
But as we entered the modern era, it became clear that “list treaties” were clumsy.
They needed frequent updating when countries enacted new laws. What about
money laundering? Securities fraud? Child pornography? It takes years of effort
to modify a treaty. Not only does it take lengthy international negotiations, but in
America it requires a signature by the President and ratification by two-thirds of the
Senate.
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The modern solution is the “dual criminality” treaty. Instead of a list of, say,
ten or twenty crimes, the treaty allows for extradition if the charged conduct would
be a crime under the laws of both countries—that is, both the requesting country that
seeks to prosecute, and the requested country that is being asked to surrender the
fugitive. And under most treaties, the crime has to be serious enough to be
punishable by more than a year in prison. This has the tremendous advantage of
being a self-updating treaty. If both treaty partners criminalize money laundering, it
now becomes an extraditable offense.
As you will have immediately realized, this requires a close assessment of the
law in two countries. For extraditions to the United States, it requires not only that
there be charges under some American criminal law (whether federal or state), but
also that the conduct would have been criminal under the law of the requested state.
The criminal statutes don’t have to match up perfectly, which of course they never
do in different countries. Rather, dual criminality exists if the offenses in the two
countries punish the same basic evil, and if the laws are sufficiently analogous. The
focus is on the acts of the defendant and the conduct charged.18
One example of the difficulties that can arise in the dual criminality context,
and which raises an important point for how extradition treaties evolved, is a case

18

9B Wright & Miller, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 22:2377.
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called Lo Duca v. United States.19 In that case, Italy sought the extradition from the
United States of a defendant named Lo Duca, who had been tried and convicted in
Italy for the crime of “association of mafia type.” The district court held that it was
an extraditable offense, and Lo Duca appealed.
At the time (and as it does now), the extradition treaty between the United
States and Italy contained a typical “dual criminality” requirement.20 The offense
for which the fugitive would be extradited had to be a crime punishable by more
than a year under both Italian and United States criminal law. Lo Duca argued that
the Italian anti-mafia law, as applied in the United States, would be unconstitutional
(and therefore not a crime) because it punishes mere membership in an association.
But the Second Circuit looked closely at the Italian anti-mafia law and concluded
that it was not so broad. The court first considered the text of the Italian law, which
defined an “association of mafia type” as follows:
An association shall be of mafia type when its members avail
themselves of the power of intimidation and of the condition of
subjection and conspiracy of silence deriving therefrom for the purpose
of committing crimes, of acquiring directly or indirectly the
management or control of economic activities, concessions,
authorizations, contract works or public services or of obtaining
unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or others.21

19

93 F.3d 1100 (2d Cir. 1996).
Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Italy, October 13, 1983, U.S.–Italy, art. II(1), T.I.A.S. No. 10837.
21
Codice penale art. 416 bis. (Italy).
20
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The Court of Appeals concluded that this statutory offense, as outlined in Italian law,
was sufficiently analogous to our federal crimes of racketeering and conspiracy.
The court then turned to the defendant’s actual conduct to see if it would have
fallen within the proscription of American criminal law.22 The evidence at the Italian
trial showed that Lo Duca, as a member of the Sicilian Mafia in New York City, had
conspired with numerous others to transport cocaine throughout the United States,
South America, and Europe, including one shipment of more than 550 kilograms of
cocaine from Colombia to Sicily. Because that conduct plainly fell within U.S.
federal drug conspiracy and racketeering laws, the court found the dual criminality
requirement satisfied and that extradition on that basis was appropriate.23
As it happened, about fifteen years later, I had occasion as the U.S.
Department of Justice Attaché to argue almost a mirror-image case before the Italian
Supreme Court of Cassation in Rome. The case involved a defendant named Emilio
Fusco, who had been indicted in the Southern District of New York. It was alleged
that he was a made member of the Genovese crime family, and that he had
participated in the murders of two people to prevent them from serving as informants
to law enforcement authorities. The charges that he faced included racketeering and
racketeering conspiracy, among other things. Working with the FBI, Italian police

22
23

Lo Duca, 93 F.3d at 1111–12; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–63 (racketeering).
Lo Duca, 93 F.3d at 1112.
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tracked down Fusco in the small town of Sant’Agnello, where he was lying low in a
house in the countryside.
When the United States requested Fusco’s extradition from Italy, he objected
that the American charges of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy did not exist
under Italian law. Thus, his lawyers argued, there was no dual criminality. The
lower court overruled his objection, but he appealed to the Italian Supreme Court of
Cassation. Because the case was so unusual, I was asked by Italian prosecutors to
appear with them before the Court of Cassation, to explain what, exactly, is the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, commonly
known as “RICO.” Now, as anyone who has ever written jury instructions for a
RICO trial can attest, it is no simple task to describe a RICO offense. In simplified
form, RICO makes it illegal to participate in the conduct of an enterprise, which is
engaged in interstate commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity. My task
before the Italian Court was to map out how the conduct charged as a RICO
violation, which involved committing a series of murders and other illegal activities
as a member of La Cosa Nostra, also would have mapped just as well onto any
number of associational crimes under Italian law. The Court ultimately agreed with

20

the United States’ position, and ordered Fusco extradited. He was later convicted of
racketeering and his conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit.24
What this pair of cases demonstrates—both Lo Duca and Fusco—is that there
are occasions when courts and litigators need to understand the laws of more than
one country. To understand how those laws do and do not line up, we need both
linguistic and conceptual understandings of both legal systems.

The “dual

criminality” provisions in extradition treaties may provide a particularly clean
illustration of this point.
The inquiry into foreign law in the Italian cases was aided tremendously by
the close institutional cooperation between the United States and Italy. But that kind
of cooperation is rarely available, and almost never so in civil cases. In my new role
as a judge on the Second Circuit, I’ve experienced a number of cases where that
close cooperation did not exist, and we consequently faced great difficulty in
discerning the foreign law at issue.
Let me talk about one last case that’s especially helpful in drawing this
difficulty out—the Vitamin C antitrust litigation.
This case was unusual because the parties generally agreed that the alleged
anticompetitive conduct occurred. Specifically, the complaint alleged a conspiracy
24

United States v. Fusco, 560 F. App’x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2014).
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to fix the price and quantity of Vitamin C exported to the United States from China,
in violation of U.S. antitrust law. The dispute centered on whether Chinese law
required the Chinese sellers’ conduct, and we had to decide whether Chinese law
made it impossible for the Chinese defendants to comply with U.S. antitrust law.25
We ultimately concluded that Chinese law required the defendants to engage in
price-fixing of Vitamin C sold on the international market and, because they could
not comply with both Chinese law and U.S. antitrust law, and because we held that
the remaining principles of international comity weighed against allowing U.S.
antitrust law to reach that conduct, we remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.26
For our purposes today, the most interesting part of the case involved the
methods by which we could determine what Chinese law requires. In particular, we
were faced with the decision about what kind of deference was owed to a foreign
sovereign that appears in a case and submits to the court what that sovereign
considers its own law to be. That was particularly notable here because, in the
district court, China’s Ministry of Commerce filed an amicus brief—the first official
appearance by the Chinese government in a U.S. court—regarding the interpretation
and applicability of its own laws.27 In addition to the submissions by the Ministry,
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the record of Rule 44.1 materials contained the Chinese regulations at issue, the
charters of the Chinese agencies responsible for overseeing the export regime,
internal industry records and trial testimony describing how that regime actually
functioned, and China’s representations to the World Trade Organization concerning
its export controls on Vitamin C.28
With respect to the submissions by the Chinese government, we initially held
that when a foreign government directly participates in U.S. court proceedings by
providing an official representation regarding the proper interpretation of its laws,
the U.S. court is bound to defer to that interpretation so long as it is reasonable under
the circumstances.29 The Supreme Court reversed our decision. It held that our
Court gave too much deference to the Ministry’s submissions, and remanded for us
to carefully consider the Ministry’s views without giving them dispositive effect.30
Specifically, the Supreme Court required that submissions by a foreign government
be evaluated against its “clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and purpose;
the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and authority of the entity or
official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency with the foreign
government’s past positions.”31 Ultimately, we read the Chinese law, gave careful
consideration to the Ministry’s statements about what the applicable laws required,
28
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and considered those statements in light of all of the factors outlined by the Supreme
Court. In a split decision, we concluded that Chinese law required the defendants to
engage in price-fixing conduct violative of U.S. antitrust law. And so, we held that
there was “true conflict” between the laws of China and the United States, such that
it was impossible for them to comply with the laws of both countries.32
The plaintiffs have recently filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court, and so it will be very interesting to see what happens next in that case.
Because one never knows if the case might come back before our Court, I have to
limit my comments to what we said in our opinion. But suffice it to say that the
Vitamin C case illustrates the challenges that we face in analyzing foreign law, even
when we have an official statement from the foreign government in question
purporting to offer an authoritative interpretation of its law. To my knowledge, our
Court was the first to apply the list of factors outlined by the Supreme Court in
assessing a foreign sovereign’s statement of its own law. But we will certainly not
be the last. The task now falls to all of us—litigators and judges, professors and
students—to sort all of this out.
In closing, I hope what you’ll take away from today’s discussion is the reality
that litigating in federal court increasingly requires a working knowledge of how to
solve foreign legal problems. We are faced with these questions in a wide variety
32
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of contexts, both civil and criminal. There is an unfilled need for training that must
begin in law school and continue among practicing lawyers and sitting judges. I
encourage you to develop the skills, both linguistic and conceptual, for determining
foreign law in U.S. courts.
Although Justice O’Connor was not the first to identify this growing need, her
words more than twenty years ago ring true today with greater force. I hope you’ll
take her words, and mine, to heart. And more than anything, I hope you enjoyed
today’s conversation as much as I did. It was truly a pleasure and an honor to speak
with you today as a part of this wonderful lecture series. Thank you.
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